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ABSTRACT: One of the most prominent parts of the 2019 Ukrainian presidential 
election was the mediatized topic of achieving Ukrainian church independence, 
and its symbol, the tomos document received from the Ecumenical Patriarch in 
January 2019. This process was a part of incumbent president Petro Poroshenko’s 
electoral campaign. Narrative analysis of this topic showed that it had a 
structure similar to that of classic Hollywood plots. It is unlike most other 
media narratives present in the information space. We prove that this topic had a 
major influence on its audience: media attention to the topic of Tomos was found to 
be closely correlated to Google search data associated with the ‘tomos’ search term 
and with electoral support for Poroshenko. However, this narrativè s audience was 
limited to the patriotic electorate, thus Poroshenko did not win the 
election. Nevertheless, the Tomos story became so influential that it can be 
considered a part of national and strategic narratives.
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INTRODUCTION
Media, electoral, national, and strategic narratives
The concept of the narrative is now widely used in the humanities. Scientists 
particularly emphasize its identity-shaping power. This power is common to 
different narrative types, such as media narratives, social media narratives, 
political narratives, electoral narratives, religious narratives, national narratives, 
and strategic narratives.
All these kinds of narratives are deeply intersecting and may be distinguished 
only for specific research purposes. They are all dimensions of Lyotard’s ‘grand 
narrative’ (Lyotard et al. 1984), and could be classified using the criteria of Ochs 
and Capps’ (Ochs–Capps 2001) as nonlinear stories with plural narrators with 
flexible moral positions, a high level of ‘tellability,’ and strong embedding in the 
current context.
Particularly after the emergence of the internet, media narratives became a 
continuous, non-discrete information flow with a transmedia structure (Herman 
2004). This is usually described in terms of ‘collapsed context,’ which means 
that nobody can predict the background nor therefore the reaction of recipients 
who may see it (Musolff 2005). Media narratives consist of many topics of 
varying duration, integrated similarly to plot lines in TV series (Zakharchenko 
2017). Most of these narratives have a chaotic structure and may not be described 
as good stories: they include sudden breakdowns, and overly long gaps in plot 
development, etc.
The social media narrative is usually constituted as either a ‘breaking 
news’ structure that is open-ended and branching, even in the case of private 
conversations, or as a so-called ‘living narrative’ – i.e. involving the tales of 
average people sat around the fireplace (Ochs–Capps 2001:12).
Among the most powerful narratives are religious ones. For example, the 
fragments of the biblical narrative are repeated a million times in different 
contexts and situations as metaphors for everyday life (Pihlaja 2017).
The national narrative is also composed of media or social media texts, as well 
as of private real-life conversations, official speeches, textbooks, and the whole 
educational process, literature, and other artistic content. K.V. Korostelina 
found (Korostelina 2014) that the typical national narrative has three levels: 
dualistic order (describing in-group and out-group), mythological narratives, 
and a normative order (explaining the political order typical of a nation). Each 
of these levels is used for shaping identity and legitimizing power.
The concept of the strategic narrative is very similar to the national one, but 
it is usually applicable to the area of warfare. Both narrative types unite people 
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on the emotional level and therefore help to govern military action; a strategic 
narrative is usually designed especially for this purpose (Pocheptsov 2012). The 
United States Department of Defense has a similar view of this term: “A key 
component of the narrative is establishing the reasons for and desired outcomes 
of the conflict, in terms understandable to relevant publics” (JDN 2013).
Electoral campaigning narratives are described in several papers – for 
example, in the story of anti-politician superhero D. Trump in the 2016 US 
electoral campaign (Schneiker 2019), a many-voiced narrative of the 2008 
Obama campaign (Capone 2010), the Musharraf campaign in Pakistan in 2008 
(Burnes 2011), and even the story of Theodore Roosevelt’s tattoos during the 
time of the presidential election of 1912 (Hoenig 2020).
Narrative involvement
All these narratives are useless if they cannot involve recipients in reading and 
participating in their creation. Busselle and Bilandzic identify four phases of 
narrative involvement: understanding, attention focus, emotional engagement, 
and narrative presence (Busselle–Bilandzic 2008).
The latter authors distinguish three types of mistrust in narratives: 
perceived fictionality (the least important aspect), inconsistency with external 
circumstances, and the absence of internal logic. Researchers conclude that 
only the second and third types lead to a lack of involvement. Accordingly, the 
persuasive ability of a narrative is determined by its narrative structure and 
conformity with dominant stereotypes rather than by its factuality (Busselle–
Bilandzic 2008:266–267).
Sometimes narrative involvement is so powerful that people ‘dissolve’ in 
the narrative and start to perceive it as a part of real life and to identify with 
the characters. This may happen with a book, film, or video game. The most 
comprehensive form of involvement leads recipients to act in line with the logic 
of the narrative. There are three eloquent examples of such involvement.
The first one is game-related engagement. The best example of this is ‘Pokemon 
Go’ – the augmented reality game by Nintendo. Nedelcheva notes that this 
involves a new generation of transmedia storytelling “that takes computer games 
to the streets and ultimately, beyond” (Nedelcheva 2016:3749). Embedded in 
contemporary lifestyles, it builds “human-to-human and human-to-technology 
relationships in the over connected world” (Nedelcheva 2016:3750).
The second example is involvement in the protest narrative mediated by social 
networks. Gerbaudo called this phenomena ‘digital enthusiasm.’ It appears as a 
result of positive emotional interactions between members and administrators of 
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protest communities, or opinion leaders, leading to a self-reinforcing emotional 
cycle: “Thus the content of user comments reinforced from the bottom-up the 
top-down narrative proposed by the admins and strongly contributed to creating 
a favorable climate of hope and reciprocal trust – the kind known to be propitious 
for facilitating protest participation” (Gerbaudo 2016:268).
The third example is the involvement of social media users in the “spectacle 
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election” (Mihailidis–Viotty 2017).
Ukrainian elections 2019 as the identity-shaping driver
The relationship between narrative involvement and people’s identity is 
strongest in times of huge social upheavals like disasters, revolutions, or 
elections (Seeger–Sellnow 2016). 
Agenda-setting theory postulates that social issues that are more salient in the 
media are usually perceived as more important by their audience (McCombs–
Shaw 1972). As a result, parties or candidates who ‘own’ those issues have 
higher electoral ratings (Sides 2006).
In the recent Ukrainian elections, there was a varied selection of differing 
agendas. The incumbent Petro Poroshenko, leader of the party European 
Solidarity, who became president based on the wave of patriotism that occurred 
after the Revolution of Dignity but was later repeatedly accused of corruption, 
owned the patriotic agenda. The social agenda was promoted by some candidates, 
the most popular of whom was Yuliia Tymoshenko, leader of the ‘Batkivshchyna’ 
(‘Motherland’) party, an ex-prime minister who usually used patriotic rhetoric 
but was accused of being affiliated with agents of Russian influence. The other 
group of candidates maintained the anti-corruption agenda; this group was led 
by led by Anatolii Hrytsenko, ex-Minister of Defence (Zakharchenko et al. 
2019). But the leader of the elections became Volodymyr Zelenskii, a former 
comedian without any political experience, supported at the time by oligarch 
Igor Kolomoyskii and his TV channel ‘1+1,’ on which Zelenskii`s TV show was 
broadcast. A unique feature of Zelenskii`s campaign was the phenomena of 
‘non-agenda owning’ – meaning that he avoided making any specific statements 
about political and economic issues, so he enjoyed the support of people with 
contrasting expectations (Zakharchenko 2019).
In the frame of narratives, there were two big stories told by candidates. The 
first one involved the ‘Servant of the people’ TV series that described the life 
of a school teacher, Vasyl Holoborodko, who surprisingly won the presidential 
elections and started changing Ukraine. Zelenskii’s main role in this series 
shaped his perception by the electorate. The second was the narrative of Tomos: 
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the story of the process of the acquisition of independence by the Orthodox 
Church of Ukraine (OCU), with the direct participation of Petro Poroshenko. 
This church was created of two unadmitted churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church – Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous 
Orthodox Church (UAOC), and some of the parishes from the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), which is subordinated to 
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). This long story unveiled its plot gradually 
in the media and finished with the receipt of the tomos – the document which 
certified the church’s independence.
The fact is that the story of receiving the tomos for the Ukrainian church lasted 
much longer than the presidential campaign of 2019. The Ukrainian church came 
under Russian power in 1686. Since then, the Ukrainian priesthood has tried several 
times to achieve independence during the periods of national revival, particularly 
in 1917, 1942, and 1990. These attempts were unsuccessful because of different 
factors. The tomos as a document became a symbol of religious independence 
only in 2018, so most Ukrainian people did not know of this word before this time. 
This canonical document officially established the autocephalous (independent) 
Orthodox Church of Ukraine. On January 5, 2019, the Ecumenical Patriarch of 
Constantinople Bartholomew and Metropolitan Epiphanius, the newly elected 
head of OCU, signed it in St. George’s Cathedral in Istanbul.
The result of candidates̀  efforts undoubtedly redirected attention to the main 
national narratives. As Korostelina showed, Ukrainian society has no single 
key narrative (Korostelina 2014:169). Instead, it has five narratives which 
have been present in the minds of Ukrainians during all periods of Ukraine’s 
independence, and compete against each other:
1.  The dual (Ukrainian and Russian) identity narrative, wherein the ‘Russian
side of Ukraine’ is imagined as more progressive;
2.  The pro-Soviet narrative that describes the ‘gold age’ of the Soviet era;
3.  The fighting-for-Ukraine’ narrative based on opposing Ukrainians as
victims and Russians as executioners;
4.  Recognition of a Ukrainian identity narrative, which contrasts the Ukrainian
state with the Russian one, and does not involve a concept of ethnicity. It
speaks about a totalitarian Russian and a democratic Ukrainian state.
5.  The multicultural civic narrative. This describes Ukraine as a unique
multicultural and tolerant society that sees its future in Europe.
Each national narrative includes the so-called ‘normative order’ – a judgment 
about the origin of power for the nation and rules concerning this power 
(Korostelina 2014:31). Thereby, the stories of candidates could fit into some of the 
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national narratives, look coherent in relation to their proponents, and convince 
individuals to vote for the ‘proper’ candidate. The story told by Zelenskii was 
appropriate with regard to the conduits of all competing national narratives. In 
contrast, Poroshenko’s story meets the requirements of adherents of the third 
and fourth Ukrainian national narratives. Therefore, during the period of the 
deployment of the tomos story, Poroshenkò s rating increased from 5.50% in 
April 2018 to 17% in February 2019. He received 15.95% of votes in the first 
round of elections in March 2019 and 24.45% in the second one.
HYPOTHESES
Both electoral narratives described above were prominent and influential. No 
doubt the ‘Servant of the People’ series was made following the typical structure 
of the TV series. However, we do not know anything about the structure of the 
tomos narrative. Taking into account its influence, it may be assumed that it also 
has a well-formed plotline.
H1: The media narrative about the tomos had all the features of well-built 
classical literature and cinema narratives.
This narrative can be seen on the level of its influence not in its entirety, but 
through the process of the plot being revealed.
H2: Deployment of this narrative led to an increase in voters’ involvement in it.
METHOD
To test the hypotheses, all mentions of the word ‘tomos’ in a sample of the 
top 100 Ukrainian news websites were identified (using the common TOP-
100 sample of the Center for Content Analysis [Zakharchenko 2018]), central 
Ukrainian TV channels, and newspapers. For this sampling procedure, a 
commercial monitoring system ‘Mediateka’ was used. In total, more than 
32,000 publications with mentions were found.
Then two trained coders looked through the sample and established the 
following categories:
– Protagonists (supporters of tomos and Ukrainian church independence)
– Antagonists (critics of tomos)
– Messages used by both sides
– Prominent episodes which influenced the plot.
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The narrative structure was compared with the classical schemata of 
Hollywood scripts (Orr 2007) – which is composed of exposition, inciting 
incident, rising action, climax, falling action, resolution, and denouement.
The influence of the narrative was evaluated in two ways. First, plot deployment 
was compared with the intensity of Google searches for the word tomos. This 
data was obtained through the Google Trends service, which revealed such data 
in the form of a percentage, normalized to the maximum value. Second, the 
average dynamics of Petro Poroshenko’s support were calculated. The results 
of polls provided by top Ukrainian sociological services, and acknowledged 
by the Sociological Association of Ukraine (Texty.org.ua 2019), were taken 
into consideration. This typically involved 4-5 electoral polls per month, 
with questions like: ‘If the presidential election took place next Sunday, who 
would you vote for?’ The share of the answer ‘Petro Poroshenko’ among the 
respondents who intended to participate in elections and had made their choice 
at the time of the poll were gathered and averaged throughout each month. As 
these results varied considerably even among trusted services, the average 
values of all public polls carried out on certain months and published on the 
websites of these services were used.
The number of contacts with the audience was evaluated by applying the 
typical methods of the Center for Content Analysis (Zakharchenko 2018). 
Namely, the latter was calculated based on public metrics of visits to digital 
media, circulation numbers for the printed press, the number of TV viewers 
according to the TV panel for TV, and the average number of listeners (data 
available through public sources) to the radio.
RESULTS
Narrative structure
The media narrative about the tomos had a typical so-called Hollywood 
structure that most fully involved the audience. This interactive and multi-
authorial story was recounted by many people and was shaped by their 
statements, accounts, reports, and action.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the story started with an exposition in January 
2018, four months before the appeal was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament. 
Well-known blogger Yurii Hudymenko launched a flash-mob by putting toys 
under the doors UOC MP (Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate) 
temples after the refusal of a priest to undertake a burial service for a child 
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who had died. He assured us that he was not doing this intentionally with the 
election in mind. Therefore, this event refreshed the issue of Ukrainian church 
independence in the media environment and made it more salient.
The inciting incident was sudden enough. It occurred when the president 
asked Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) to turn to Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew I requesting that the independence of the Ukrainian church be 
granted. All parliamentary groups that positioned themselves as patriotic and 
pro-European had no choice but to vote for this appeal, otherwise they could 
have been blamed by Poroshenko for having a pro-Russian position. Then the 
story developed comparatively slowly because of the summer season. Only 
one meaningful event happened at that time: a prayer meeting dedicated to 
the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus, which is celebrated by all Ukrainian 
Orthodox Churches annually and is seen as the core event that proves the 
authentic nature of Ukrainian Orthodox Christianity.
Figure 1. Tomos narrative deployment. The number of mentions of the word ‘tomos’ in 
the sample and the plot structure
Source: Data from the Mediateka monitoring system, with authors’ explanation.
The real start of rising action occurred in September 2018 when a lot of 
protagonists, as well as antagonists, joined in the narration. After that, the 
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structure was typical of the plot of a novel: success was interspersed with failure, 
and vice versa. Moments of optimism alternated with moments of pessimism – 
for example, at the end of November 2018, just before the constitution of the 
new Ukrainian church was adopted in Constantinople, two contrasting fake 
statements in the media were detected and widely shared on Facebook. The 
first claimed that the tomos had already been received. The second assured the 
audience that, finally, Bartholomew I of Constantinople had decided to refuse 
the Ukrainian parliament’s appeal. All these messages made the information 
space more saturated and the plot more exciting.
The climax and resolution were the phases that took place in the period that 
followed the end of November 2018, when the church constitution was adopted, 
until January 2019, when the tomos was officially given to the Metropolitan 
Epiphanius of Kyiv and All Ukraine. After that, attention to the topic steadily 
decreased and attention overflowed to the election narrative – the so-called 
‘horse racing’ story.
Narrative characters
All the heroes of the news in this topic may be classified as protagonists or 
supporters of the tomos, or antagonists/opponents. The first category includes 
predominantly the top officials and other members of Poroshenko’s team 
(Poroshenko, Head of Parliament Andrii Parubii), as well as the hierarchs 
of UOC KP (its leader Filaret, and its metropolitans Zorya and Epiphanius) 
and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Patriarch Bartholomew). 
Russian politicians (president Vladimir Putin, his spokesperson Dmitrii 
Peskov, and Prime-Minister Dmitrii Medvedev), pro-Russian politicians 
in Ukraine (MPs Vadym Novinskyi and Yurii Boyko), hierarchs of MOC 
(patriarch Kirill, Bishop Climent), and UPC MP (metropolitan Onufrii) may 
be located in the second category.
The protagonists significantly predominated in the story compared to the 
antagonists. Their actions and speeches reached a much larger audience 
than those of the antagonists. However, the antagonists also were important 
(see Figure 2). Their participation was quite well embedded in the story 
logic and framework. They provided the necessary pungency of the plot. 
A short-term loss of the protagonists’ initiative happened in January 2019 
in relation to a media incident concerning the presence of a businessman 
with a mixed reputation (Olexandr Petrovskii) at the ceremony presenting 
the tomos.
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Figure 2. Key characters and their statements’ contact with the audience
Source: Data generated through the semi-automatic coding of Mediateka media publications dataset, applying 
the audience reach methodology of the Center for Content Analysis.
Narrative messages
The story was saturated with detailed PR messages produced by both sides 
in the conflict. Along with the critics of the idea of church independence, 
antagonists tried to depreciate the standing of Poroshenko in relation to this 
achievement (see Table 1).
There is another interesting observation. The roles of protagonists were 
clearly divided: political issues connected to the story were commented on 
by politicians, and religious issues by priests. On the other hand, the opposite 
occurred with the antagonists: Russian and pro-Russian politicians vigorously 
commented on political as well as on church issues. This may be attributed to 
the church’s level of separation from the state.
Communication channels
Different media with different political positions – even pro-Russian 
(Zakharchenko 2018) – provided almost identical stories about the tomos. In 
each of the analyzed media, the share of texts in which the tomos was mentioned 
along with antagonists’ messages was, on average, 10%, and varied from 8% to 
13%. The other share of about 90% was comprised of texts with protagonists’ 
messages. This cannot be attributed to the political commitment of the media, 
thus the main explanation is the criterion of media logic (Harcup–O’Neill, 2001): 
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Table 1. Key messages of protagonists and antagonists
Church issues Political issues Russian role Constantinople’s role
Poroshenko`s 


























will not break ties 






instead of a 
bribe (his joke)
The tomos is 
already written 





















come to work 
on the done 
deal of church 
independence 
(Daniil)
I will not 
intervene in 
church issues 
after the receipt 







church is a 











It is assumed 
that Exarchs 





assures that he 
will popularize 
the tomos at his 
own expense
OCU will not 





























is splitting the 
church and wants 




is a form of 
Poroshenko`s 
publicity, as he 
has no other 
results 
The tomos will 





The church in 
Ukraine will 




It is a political 














































the bribe for 
Bartholomew, 
but Poroshenko 
kept it for 
himself 


























Source: Data generated by coding Mediateka media publications dataset.
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i.e. protagonists, especially Ukrainian politicians, are more commonly 
portrayed in Ukrainian media than the Russian establishment, and have direct 
connections with them (for example, through the distribution of press releases 
and giving press conferences in Kyiv). Thereby, the protagonists̀  messages 
spread better because of the speakers’ importance, as perceived by journalists, 
the availability of their statements to news editors, the high level of activity 
of Ukrainian protagonists, topic validity, etc. It should be noted that readers 
who did not support the church’s independence heard the same story about the 
tomos as their opponents. Thus the only difference could have been in their 
perceptions. For example, supporters of the tomos could have perceived this 
story as a kind of archetypical ‘Odyssean’ narrative about a long journey and 
ultimate goal, while adversaries saw it as a story about a catastrophe, like the 
tale about the deaths in Pompeii.
Figure 3. Comparison of media coverage of the tomos with people’s engagement 
(Google search activity and Poroshenko’s electoral support)
Source: Data from the Mediateka monitoring system, Google trends, and average data from polls released 
by the ‘Rating’ group, Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, ‘SOCIS’ company, Razumkov Centre, GFK 
Ukraine, Ukrainian Institute of Social Investigations (named after Oleksandr Yaremenko) and the Center for 
Social Monitoring.
Readers’ involvement
A comparison of the number of mentions of the tomos in media using Google 
Trends data and polls data (see Figure 3) indicates the good correlation between 
these three parameters between April 2018 and January 2019 (see Table 2). 
After this point, diverging trends occur, as followers of the story switched to 
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the ‘horse racing’ electoral narrative. On the other hand, almost throughout the 
entire period, Google search interest in ‘tomos’ was less than the media coverage 
of this topic. Only once was the situation the opposite – in October, when the 
uniting council of OCU was held – and in January 2019, both indicators reached 
their maximum. In other words, almost all the time media were more interested 
in the topic of the tomos than their readers.
Table 2. Correlations coefficients of the number of mentions of ‘tomos’ in media, 
Google Trends data, and polling data between April 2018 and January 2019
 Media mentions Google search activity Electoral support
Media mentions 1.00
Google search activity 0.96 1.00
Electoral support 0.82 0.76 1.00
Source: Author’s own calculations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Based on the narrative structure described in the previous chapter, it is clear 
that hypothesis 1 is true: the structure of the tomos narrative portrayed by 
Ukrainian media shows that it was similar to that of classic Hollywood plots. It 
is unlike most other media narratives that are present in the information space.
Therefore, it makes sense that public attention to the narrative and its impact 
on the electoral decision are clearly supported by the correlation. This proves 
hyposethis 2. Even people who were not interested in Orthodox Christianity 
started to root for the result of this story. The proof can be seen in a well-known 
Facebook meme: ‘I am an atheist. But an atheist of Kyiv Patriarchate’ (Novoe 
Vremya 2018).
As can be seen from Figure 3, the main driver of this public attention was 
media attention – which, for its part, was constituted by the media logic 
(Harcup–O’Neill 2001). It may be assumed that the main impact drivers were 
the media-related weight of the Ukrainian president, the validity of this issue 
for a big part of Ukrainian society, its singular importance for the Ukrainian 
political process, and strong resistance from Russia and pro-Russian politicians 
in Ukraine.
Almost all resistance was inefficient while it remained related to the topic of 
the Orthodox Church. All the messages of antagonists remained an expected 
part of the plot. Therefore, supporters of church independence had no reason to 
change their opinion about the issue. Only at the end of the story did pro-Russian 
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media manage to make corruption the framing element of the topic (How the 
“Narik” … 2019). This was the first time that supporters were influenced by 
opponents’ messages.
Despite the absence of limitations to an Orthodox audience, this narrative was 
limited to the patriotic part of the electorate. We may assume that people who 
were neither Orthodox Christians nor pronounced patriots were not involved in 
this narrative, and were not convinced by it. As a result, Poroshenko’s support 
did not exceed the 24.45% obtained in the second round of elections.
Nevertheless, the story about the tomos became so influential that it started 
being used as one of the defining factors of the dichotomy between patriots and 
non-patriots (Maidanuk 2019); between a spiritual Russian church, and a down-
to-earth European church (Vasiliy Shchipkov: Presenting … 2019) – and even as 
one of the goals in the strategic confrontation with Russia (NISR 2019).
Therefore, the latter can be considered not only a media narrative, but also 
part of the national narrative (pro-Ukrainian as well as pro-Russian), and even 
as an element of the strategic narrative. Furthermore, it may be assumed that it 
was purposefully made part of these larger narratives.
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